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Abstract 
Libertarian paternalism is often considered as an 
oxymoron that uses the means of libertarianism to meet 
the ends of paternalism. It is considered as paternalistic as 
it covertly transforms into a paternalistic apparatus 
through the endorsement of the choices the 
State/authority wants people to make. It is argued that 
since libertarian paternalism invokes incentives which 
works differently than coercion, this paper and various 
other scholars reiterate and respond by arguing that the 
mere replacement of coercion with incentives does not 
make libertarian paternalism less paternalistic. A 
libertarian paternal State exploits the malleability of men 
to mould their behaviour according to the propositions of 
the ruling class which the rulers often assert to be in the 
best interests of the masses. In this article, Orwell‟s Animal 
Farm, would be used as an analogy to unpack and 
conceptually analyse the ethical implications of libertarian 
paternalism. 
Keywords: Paternalistic State, Dystopic Politics, Orwell and NUDGES 
1. Introduction 
Libertarian paternalism is a new regulatory philosophy that has 
gained prominence post the break of the millennium. This 
oxymoronic view fuses the diametrically opposite ideas of 
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interventionist paternalism and choice preserving libertarianism. This 
controversial idea is centred on authorities/choice architects 
nudging people to make choices that will make their lives “longer, 
happier and healthier” through the employment of incentives. 
George Orwell‟s dystopic novel, Animal Farm speaks, symbolically 
about how the big brotherly state manipulates the malleability of 
men to further the interests of the priviledged ruling class. 
The paper elaborates the parallels between the dystopian states as 
described by Orwell and the libertarian paternal State of Thaler and 
Sunstein. The libertarian aspect of libertarian paternalism is 
analysed to see whether choice is framed or understood as the 
preservation of a mere absence of coercion or does it actually refer 
to the exercise of freedom of choice without fear or favour. The 
important question in the context of libertarian paternalism 
concerns with the meaning of “good choice” and “bad choice” and 
the rationale of the parameters used to validate and evaluate the 
same. Furthermore, the fundamental question of the role of State 
intervention, whether for welfare measures or otherwise, are 
explored in the paper.  
2. Libertarian Paternalism and Orwellian Dictatorship 
“But sometimes you might make the wrong decisions, comrades, 
and then where should we be? asks Squealer the pig in George 
Orwell‟s Animal Farm (2009). Squealer, the chief propaganda 
administrator of the dystopian Animal Farm uses this unanswered 
question to take away the right to choose from the Free Beasts of 
the land. 6 decades later Richard Thaler and Cass R Sunstein 
responds from the other side of the Atlantic to the Orwellian 
question penned in 1943. Their response is articulated through their 
controversial idea of Libertarian paternalism; where should we be 
if you make wrong decisions shouts out Squealer, “libertarian 
paternalism”, retorts Thaler and Sunstein with aplomb.  Ironically, 
in the novel, Squealer was the companion of the oppressor and 
under the garb of this possibility of error, Napoleon, the oppressive 
protagonist decides that the council of pigs (characters in the novel) 
would take all the important decisions. This method resulted in a 
paternalistic State. Thaler and Sunstein states that their ideal of 
Libertarian paternalism wants to bring in a new means in which it 
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is legitimate for the choice architect to influence people‟s behaviour 
to “make their lives longer, healthier and better” and which allows 
people who don‟t conform to the choice and the architects‟ vision to 
“go their own way” and “exercise their freedom” (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). 
Interestingly the Orwellian connection of Libertarian Paternalism 
does not stop at the dystopian novel Animal Farm. It stretches 
Orwell‟s masterpiece 1984 that tells us the tale of a big brother, 
symbolically referring to the state monopoly through governmental 
apparatus and “the party” who ruled Oceania not “for its own 
ends, but for the good of the majority” (Orwell, 1984, p. 339). The 
protagonist Winston in one of his soliloquies in the novel identifies 
that the omnipresent party acts for the best interest of the masses 
for people are “frail, cowardly creatures” who are unable to 
exercise liberty properly and due to this inability, the masses must 
be ruled over and systematically deceived by others who were 
stronger than them" (Orwell, 1984, p. 331). Almost 7 decades after 
Orwell‟s protagonist uttered the fateful words “You are ruling over 
us for our own good,…You believe that human beings are not fit to 
govern themselves, and therefore —" [big brother must rule us] 
(Orwell, 1984, p. 331). Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their 
work Nudge Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 
comes up with statements and positions that could be seen as a 
reminiscent of the dystopic world in 1984, such as the idea 
presented by the state apparatuses that assert that human beings 
consider choices in life to be a “nuisance” and therefore prefer 
default choices (Thaler & Sunstein, 2000). These default choices, 
conceived by choice architects work towards the manipulation of 
the minds of people to move in certain directions and convince 
people of the fact that it “will make their lives better” (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2000). This, they argue, is the correct approach between 
multiplicity of choices and interventionist paternalism for ensuring 
progress and continuity. It is important to note that while Orwell‟s 
Big Brother became a „cult villain‟ because of his oppressive 
functioning and is frequently used as a warning against 
government intervention in the lives of citizens, Thaler and 
Sunstein has tried to euphemise the „big brothers‟ and their 
behaviours through their conceptualisation of the term “NUDGE” 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2000) which is arguably a refurbished idea, 
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similar to the oppressive state functioning as mentioned in Orwell‟s 
novels. The only change observable is the addition of the prefix 
libertarian. Thaler and Sunstein rhetorically reminds the readers of 
the question, Squealer asks the animals—what if a person makes 
the wrong choice. In Animal Farm, the animals lost their liberty and 
the right to choose so that they could avoid the risk of bad choices. 
The possible implications therefore, are eerily reminiscent of the 
novel, Animal Farm as well. 
3. Limits of Libertarian Paternalism and NUDGES 
The argument that libertarian paternalism celebrates choice is 
fundamental to its claims of being different from paternalism. The 
default is chosen by the choice architect and the choice architect, in 
most of the cases, has a specific intention in selecting a default. To 
further the reason behind the default, the choice architect attempts 
to make the default retain its significance. Furthermore, to protect 
the default choice, as rightly identified by Sunstein, the choice 
architects ensure that the burdens or costs imposed on people who 
do not conform or choose the road prescribed by the choice 
architects suffer the cost of non-compliance, albeit under the garb 
of a simplistic notion of „wrong choices‟ (Sunstein, 2015). This 
tendency to force the will of the choice architect on the masses casts 
doubts on the welfarist claims of libertarianism in this regulatory 
hybrid. Most of the rights have an affirmative and negative element 
which when combined allows the exercise or reservation of the 
right. Right to choose also has these two parts: exercising the right 
to choose and reserving the exercise as the selector might not take 
an immediate decision to avoid the costs of exercising the choice. 
The choice architect under the garb of welfare and best interest of 
the chooser forcibly binds the chooser to one end of the bargain and 
imposes all the costs associated with such choice on him in addition 
to any costs by way of deterrence to prevent the usurpation of the 
default. On the other hand, of the six letters of the word NUDGES, 
“N” which denotes incentives is outright paternalistic while two 
others “D” of defaults and “S” representing structuring of complex 
choices are not always libertarian as they take their shade on the 
basis of the intentions of the choice architect. The rest 3 are 
understanding mappings, expecting error and giving feedback 
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which are not means to any end but are tools to decipher the 
chooser‟s mind and are therefore neither libertarian nor 
paternalistic.  
This paper argues that the incentives cause the problem of 
redistribution which is a much more paternal and welfarist than 
libertarian. An Indian State which pays a salary of 100 rupees a day 
to teenage mothers for each day who are not pregnant would be 
incurring significant expenses due to the paucity of funds available 
to the State and it might even be seen as a measure that endorses 
child marriage or hedonism (if unmarried) in the particular socio-
cultural context in India. Similarly if the government provides 
monetary assistance to alcoholics or smokers from the public 
exchequer, the incentive would lead to a context wherein people 
who did not indulge in these social evils would pay for those who 
indulged it; in other words, the alcoholics and smokers would 
benefit out of their irrational choices qua health at the expense of 
the rational citizens. The opposition towards these programmes 
cannot be understood as a sheer malice against any habit or an 
intervention to assist individuals affected by social evils but rather, 
it is against calling such policies libertarian as it is actually the 
authoritarian State working under the guise of working for the 
welfare of the citizens.  
Choice involves the right to choose and the right to not to be 
discriminated qua the choice in relation to others in the same 
category. For a policy to be truly libertarian, there should be no loss 
associated with the choice for the person and no gain should accrue 
to others which is not a result of special assistance by the State due 
to promotion of any policy which the person is already in 
conformity with or is not interested buying into; anything against 
this would be paternalistic action by the State for promoting its 
ideal and ensuring conformity with it. The question of incentive 
gains further significance when one is to consider Sunstein‟s 
admission that less educated, less sophisticated and poor are less 
confidant of making choices and are more influenced by the 
defaults of the government (Sunstein, 2015). The gullibility of the 
vulnerable class coupled along with their disadvantaged social 
position would allow the State to successfully use the incentives to 
bring these classes within its vision and successfully disarm their 
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faculty of choice with the incentives. Paternalism is by definition 
State/individual interference, through coercion or incentive, under 
a claim of action for the benefit of the individual and thus 
incentivising an act is more paternalistic than it is libertarian. This 
is so because the temptation promoted by the State through the 
incentives is more likely to have more vantage point for the chooser 
which will inevitably make him/her to choose the State‟s option.  
Incentives are a bigger tool to make people convinced of the 
government‟s propositions about state sponsored wellness and 
good decisions for life. Incentives unlike coercive tactics are useful 
as they posit a dilemma or a paradox and the individual seeks to 
free himself/herself from it by adopting the available „choices‟. 
Adding further lethality to the argument in favour of incentives is 
that they can work well with rational argumentative individuals as 
well. Econ, the economic man of Thaler and Sunstein, who chooses 
unfailingly well, is also admitted to be tempted by the prospect of 
incentives (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). If the incentives are so 
powerful that they can convince rational and irrational individuals 
with more or less same efficacy and make them follow paths they 
might not have chosen in the absence of such temptations, then any 
choice made under the influence of an incentive to ensure a better 
life is nothing but paternalistic welfarism and it has nothing to do 
with preservation of freedom of choice. 
4. Paternalistic Welfarism – A Disguise 
A closer look at the arguments of Sunstein and Thaler show that 
the idea that they have proposed is more oriented towards 
promotion of welfare and has less to do about liberty. The meaning 
given to the term “Libertarian Paternalism” is paternalism which 
does not curtail the liberty of people (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) i.e, 
the end of paternalism is sought to be achieved through the means 
of preservation of liberty. The classic example of the paternalistic 
welfarism is the book itself which is more than capable of 
convincing a libertarian to believe that the arch planner‟s actions 
are the best course of action that preserves liberty in both long and 
short terms. The idea that is being argued for is not pertaining to 
the preservation of liberty but a condition of utilitarian welfarism 
substantiated with a rhetoric of how inefficient individuals are 
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when making difficult choices, and therefore, the arch planners 
must structure the choice frame in a such a manner that the choices 
that people make are oriented towards their own good, benefit and 
welfare. 
Once again the spectre of the party that loomed over the men of 
1984 comes to prominence here. The antagonist in 1984 asserts that 
the choice of mankind was “between freedom and happiness" and 
for most men happiness was better than freedom and therefore, the 
party is acting for the happiness of the masses (Orwell, 1984). The 
very title of Thaler and Sunstein‟s book openly declares that it is 
inter-alia about improving decisions about happiness. Throughout 
the book, the sentiment is that NUDGES can improve people‟s lives 
and solve society‟s problems (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The reasons 
that Sunstein offers for justifying choice architects and their action 
is quite peculiar; it‟s his view that choice architecture “help to 
produce decisions that will make people happier or otherwise better 
off, and that are either wise or right” (emphasis supplied) (Sunstein, 
2015). The important question that arises at this juncture is 
concerning the location where the element of libertarian choice 
rests in this policy of decisions for the welfare of the person.  
To understand how the framing of choice architecture by 
government goes against libertarianism, one must see the 
distinction of the role of government in libertarian and paternalistic 
systems. In a libertarian system, the role of the government is 
limited to ensuring the protection of the individual and the safety 
of the individual (Boaz, 1998). The government is the facilitator 
who provides a framework that enables the individual to pursue 
what he deems good for himself with the sole caveat of non-
interference with similar rights of others (Boaz, 1998). Any action of 
the government by which it seeks to do anything more that 
ensuring safety and being a facilitator the acts would deprive the 
individual of their rights and liberties (Boaz, 1998). Such 
overstepping of the government for the purposes of planning the 
economy, organising the society, regulates the actions of people the 
government violates and nullifies the very reason of its existence 
(Libertarianism, 2017). Thus it is clear that any action by 
government to fiddle with the choices of men is anti-libertarian.  
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Dworkin defines Paternalism as “the interference with a person's 
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the 
welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the 
person”(1972). When the State executes programmes which are 
aimed at making people go the „right way‟ or make „better 
decisions for a happier life‟, it opens itself to be labelled as paternal 
intervention. Sunstein and Thaler defends libertarian paternalism 
on the ground that it does not involve coercion and absence of 
coercion and ensures that it does not restrict choices (Sunstein, 
2015). The assumption that coercion is the key element in 
determining the degree of restriction is not really correct. 
Paternalism need not always be coercive. Incentives, as 
demonstrated above, are much more lethal as they infiltrate the 
mind to let the arch planners do as they desire as opposed to the 
blunt coercion as a practice or tool of oppression which operates 
from an external plane. Instead of helping people to tide over the 
instinctive impulses, lucrative incentives influence people to sell 
their freedom of choice by accepting the “best choice for life and 
happiness‟ as predefined by the government; this solution by 
nature fetters the development and outsources right to choose to 
government. 
Literature on power classifies power into Power Over and Power 
To/Social Power (Dowding, 2011). Social Power is the ability to 
change the incentive structure of another while Power To is the 
ability to determine the outcome (Marciano & Josselin, 2007). In a 
paternalistic system, the government can apply its vastly superior 
social power to make people reframe their incentive structure by 
incentivising the choices it expects people to make. Thaler and 
Sunstein‟s libertarian aspect of libertarian paternalism is a situation 
where people are “free to do what they like - and to opt out of 
undesirable arrangements if they want to do so” (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). The immense social power wielded by the State 
however is not really conducive for the existence of this system. 
The government can tempt the individual with incentives and 
manipulate his incentive structure subtly so that the indirect denial 
of freedom of choice in a situation which is artificially created 
would ensure a favourable outcome for the government in so far 
that it may actually be considered as libertarian. In reality, it 
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remains as a case of making people want what the government 
wants them to desire by altering the very rules of game.     
The threat of this welfarism is that it is might be the beginning of a 
continued reaction. The difficulty is in drawing a line for 
interventionist policies under the name of welfare. Martin 
Niemöller, the famed anti-Nazi Theologian best captures the result 
of this dilemma. Seven years of life in concentration camps made 
Niemöller confess about the short sightedness of his policy of being 
a mute spectator of Nazi intervention in the following words 
When the Nazis came for the communists, I did not speak 
out as I was not a communist. When they came for the trade 
unionists, I did not speak out as I was not a trade unionist. 
When they came for the Jews, I did not speak out as I was 
not a Jew. When they came for me, there was no one left to 
speak out for me. (Niemöller, n.d.)  
The liberty to take bad decisions is better than dangerous 
paternalistic government intervention which might take away the 
very right to take any decision. It‟s not the welfare motive as 
envisioned by the government that must be satisfied but my will is 
to be satisfied in making any personal choice, whether good or bad 
in the eyes of the government. 
5. Manipulation of Choice and Redistribution of Resources 
Redistribution of resources and unmitigated manipulation of the 
choice architect are two possible consequences of libertarian 
paternalism and the occurrence of either strikes at the very root of 
libertarian values. The US Supreme Court decision in School Dist. of 
Abington Tp. v. Schempp (374 U. S 203, 1963) illustrates how 
NUDGES cross the limit and cause redistribution and moulds 
minds as per the choice architect. First, the case is examined to see 
how the power to design choice impacts libertarianism. The case 
pertained to certain provisions of Pennsylvania Prayer Statute 
which required the reading of 10 verses of Bible at every public 
school at the beginning of the school day (374 U.S. 203, 1963). 
Religion was found to be a fundamental part of the public life and 
the government. The Supreme Court revered religion in several of 
its practises by invoking the name of God when taking Oaths to 
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office, while opening the session of the Congress or the Court (374 
U.S. 203, 1963). As religion was a fundamental part of public life, it 
is for the choice architect to ensure that the masses follow religion 
and for this he creates a default rule of reading out verses every 
day. To pass off the measure as non-paternalistic, he “allows” them 
to choose to opt out of the measure by a written request and an 
auxiliary provision which bars any comments on the verses read to 
prevent allegations of indoctrination and propaganda. 
The courts, both trial and apex, strikes down the measure despite 
the provision for exclusion on written request. The key point which 
does not allow the case to be used as the perfect example is the 
Constitutional policy of neutrality towards religion in the present 
case and the legality of the measures to protect the health of people 
or inculcation of habit if saving for future. Another notable point is 
an argument by the Appellant that the cost of exclusion almost 
made the default the only option. To the benefit of Thaler and 
Sunstein, they have clearly stated that NUDGES are counted as 
libertarian paternalistic only if the costs of the measures are low. To 
discern which costs are less and which costs are more, the 
possibility of power creeps in favour of paternalism in the course of 
time.  
A couple of judgements of the Indian Courts would show how 
libertarian paternalism can turn into absolute paternalism owing to 
the clustering of gradual power in favour of paternalism. The 
Constitution of India (Constitution of India, Section 51-A(a)) and 
The National Honour Act (The Prevention Of Insults To National 
Honour Act, 1971) has provisions for the respect of the national 
anthem. The first case Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors 
held that standing up at the time national anthem is not 
disrespectful (All India Reporter, 1987). However, the markedly 
libertarian temperament qua the national anthem takes a turn for 
the worse as we move on. The Calcutta High Court in Kamal Dey vs 
Union of India (Calcutta High Court Notes (Calcutta), 329, 2016) and 
the Madras High Court in N. Selvathirumal vs Union of India (All 
India Reporter, 2016) expressly made it compulsory to sing the 
national anthem in schools. The Ministry of Home Affairs, on 
receiving the direction of the Calcutta High Court issued orders to 
the concerned State governments to make national anthem 
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compulsory at the beginning of the day‟s work (Orders Relating To 
The National Anthem Of India III(5), 2017). To cap everything in 
Shyam Narayan Chouksey vs Union of India, the Apex Court ordered 
that it is the duty of every citizen to show respect to the national 
anthem as it is a symbol of “Constitutional Patriotism and inherent 
national quality”(Manupatra/Supreme Court Order, 2016). The 
idea of respect to national anthem changed from a constitutional 
nudge to paternalistic shove at the end.  
 
In the Indian and American cases what started out as mere show of 
respect turned out to be a paternal mandate owing to the power 
that gradually NUDGEd the libertarian element out of the frame. 
Power to design choice frames, in itself, might not be anti-
libertarian but the power is the problem. The ends of paternalism 
would slowly and gradually grow at the expense of the means of 
libertarianism in libertarian paternalism making it standalone 
paternalism in due course. The libertarian choice is a mere façade 
for achieving the end of paternalism. Orwell in Animal Farm 
explains the culmination of power beautifully (Orwell, 2009). The 
pigs were just another set of animals in the beginning; later they 
chaired the Sunday meetings of animals and after some infighting 
between them; Napoleon, the victor of the fight decided that a 
committee of the pigs will make decisions for the benefit of all the 
animals. To the detriment of others, the pigs went on to change the 
very commandments which were held sacred and they finally 
teamed up with men whom they had overthrown after a bloodied 
fight. The trajectory of the power curve mostly starts out as mere 
directives and ends as outright paternalism, the possibility of 
irrational choices by oneself is used to take away the right of choice 
itself. 
The impenetrable walls of Troy fell before the Greeks as the Trojan 
horse infiltrated the mighty walls. State intervention is not being 
equated to the Trojan horse here, but allowing the State to 
manipulate the choice is letting the Trojan horse of “best interest 
decision” into the walls of our liberty to choose. The real possibility 
of losing liberty by allowing the State to intervene in our choices is 
a real concern. Sunstein himself moves in this direction when he 
asserts that the system will tilt towards the abdication of power to 
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choose. The automatic system or impulsive system is unruly while 
the reflective system employs the intellect and faculty of reason 
and logic to reach conclusions. The ghastly solution offered by 
Sunstein to avoid the „bad‟ decisions arising out of unreal optimism 
and lack of foresight is to choose „not to choose‟ and embrace the 
defaults that Orwell‟s 1984 shows us when he provides the glimpse 
of what might happen if the State decided to manipulate 
individual‟s choices. O'Brien, the antagonist in 1984 openly says, 
“We control life, Winston, at all levels. You are imagining that there 
is something called human nature which will be outraged by what 
we do and will turn against us. But we create human nature. Men 
are infinitely malleable” (Orwell, 1984). This malleability of 
individuals might be dextrously used by the State to convert its 
citizens to unthinking puppets.  
Redistribution of resources is another point that needs 
consideration from the School Dist. of Abington Tp v. Schempp 
decision. Libertarianism might not be antithetical to manipulation 
of choice but redistribution of resources or bearing of costs for the 
benefit of another can never be encompassed within libertarianism. 
The Court affirmed that the tax payer‟s money cannot be used for 
the promotion of religion (School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 
216). The reasoning for the decision is based on the neutrality of the 
Government towards religion. The comparison that is sought to be 
drawn here is that the lines of cases which deal with similar issues 
and exhibit a common pattern which is action against promotion of 
beliefs of a certain group. Cases including Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 
421, 1962), Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (530 U.S. 290), 
McCollum v. Board of Education (333 U.S. 203, 1948) unequivocally 
hold that promotion of religion by State is illegal as it gives the 
religion, so promoted, a seal of approval to affect other religions or 
atheism. The default choice of pro religious policy is advantageous 
to people who hold certain beliefs and disadvantageous to others. 
This is opposed to a libertarian view „making our choices‟. 
Extrapolation of the argument into the realm of taxation would 
mean that resources of atheist tax payers‟ would flow for the 
benefit of faithful taxpayers in case of State sponsored religious 
activities. The point to be argued is that in a libertarian system, no 
rights could be given positive assistance (Arneson, 2000) and any 
assistance rendered by the State for one set of beliefs/practices 
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invariably will cause a denial of such benefits and imposition of 
costs in the form of loss of possible benefit on all other non-
conformists‟ lives whether neutral or opposed to the State, and the 
members of other faiths. The money that would have been used for 
general public purpose is used for the benefits of these chosen ones 
causing a redistribution of wealth. As Reiman points out libertarian 
paternalism is opposed to using an individual as a resource for 
others as it involves disadvantage (actual or notional) for people 
who were not conformists to the arch planner‟s vision without any 
consent or affirmation from their part (Reiman, 1981). 
The Save More Tomorrow Plan is touted as a perfect opportunity to 
implement libertarian paternalism by setting the default in favour 
of the plan so that the persons enrolled gets free money from the 
employer (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The arguments made by 
Sunstein and Thaler do not consider the problem of exhaustibility 
of resources of the employer and subsequent detriment that the 
persons who wilfully made the choice might have suffered owing 
to en masse enrolment by default. The employer might set up a cap 
on contribution to reduce the per capita contribution or appropriate 
funds earmarked for other employee benefits towards this resulting 
in a gain for the unmindful employee at the expense of the prudent 
one and if the employer is government then the increase in 
contributions might be passed on to the taxpayers, causing further 
redistribution (Mitchell, 2005). The magnitude of the incentive also 
matters, a dollar a day obesity incentive may turn the head of an 
unemployed man but for a wealthy individual, it might not even 
matter as this would be considered as a miniscule incentive and 
this might lead to a redistribution of wealth (Wikler, 1978). To 
ensure participation of all classes, the government might need to 
propose the incentive differently wherein that would imply that it 
has to negotiate the threat of redistribution looming large over such 
increased incentives as the larger incentive is the taxpayers‟ money 
which would be required to be spent on a wealthy yet not 
responsible person. Undoubtedly, the redistributive benefits that 
arise out of such welfarist default might be infinitely better than the 
libertarian default that denies individual‟s such benefits. At the end 
of the day, however, calling such a redistributive welfarist measure 
libertarian is oxymoronic as libertarianism ends where 
redistribution begins.  
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The asymmetry that these redistributive incentives create is 
unreasonable and disproportionate. This is not only because it 
rewards incompetent and irrational decision making of a few and 
covers the failure of the government to work within its existential 
causes but also in so far as the promotion of unusual „best interests‟ 
cover the vested interests and prejudice against the fundamental 
right (the State ought to give) to choose. What it gains, therefore, is 
a platform to advance parochial political welfarism. 
6. Conclusion 
The authors, Thaler and Sunstein, establish NUDGES as the 
panacea for the short-termism inherent in humans. However the, 
salvation is not the nudges but it lies within the NUDGES. 
Understanding mappings, Giving feedback, Expecting error 
amongst the NUDGES along with empowerment through 
information can help people make farsighted decisions that will 
enhance their liberty. As the authors rightly point out, humans face 
difficulties in making difficult choices due to lack of information or 
due to a disregard of attenuating circumstances or due to a sheer 
bias towards or against certain choices. The solution to this is not 
outsourcing of the choice to arch planners or usurpation or dilution 
of power to choose. Instead, strengthening the decision making 
capabilities of individuals so that the right choose can be exercised 
in the optimal manner by the individual himself is important and 
required. Liberty is strengthened when freedom of choice is 
exercised even when making rare and difficult choices and any 
attempt to manipulate the mind or directing it to any particular end 
is blatant paternalism. Thaler and Sunstein could not have been 
more right when they pointed out that men make better choices 
when they are aware of what they are doing (Improving Decisions 
About  Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard H. Thaler Cass R. 
Sunstein) and the solution for irrational choices due to ignorance is 
not outsourcing the choice but teaching men to make better choices. 
The intention should never be to curtail liberty but enabling people 
to make informed choices on their own without intervention. 
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